Riverisland, Parol Evidence, and the Fraud Exception

We recently wrote about contract integration clauses, which will usually state that the contract is “completely integrated,” and the parol evidence rule, which works to keep out prior or contemporaneous statements or writings that would modify the contract.  In this post we discuss Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno–Madera Production Credit Assn., 55 Cal. 4th 1169 (2013).   In short, Riverisland states that the parol evidence rule is not a bar to evidence that goes to show fraud in connection with the contract, and the court may look to, for example, prior statements and emails, to determined what agreement was made by the parties.

In Riverisland, the plaintiffs restructured and reaffirmed a debt owed to the Fresno-Madera Production Credit Association (“Credit Association”).  The restructuring agreement provided that the Credit Association would take no enforcement action for three months if the plaintiffs made specified payments and pledged eight (8) parcels of land as additional collateral.

Later, the plaintiffs fell behind on payments and the Credit Association instituted foreclosure proceedings. Eventually, the plaintiffs repaid the loan and the Credit Association dismissed its foreclosure proceedings.

However, the plaintiffs filed an action seeking damages for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and included causes of action for rescission and reformation of the restructuring agreement. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the Credit Association’s vice president told them two weeks before the agreement was signed that the Credit Association would extend the loan for two years in exchange for two “ranch properties” as the additional real-property collateral, but the written contract actually allowed for only an additional three months of forbearance and identified eight (8) parcels as additional collateral.

The plaintiffs did not read the agreement, but simply signed it at the locations tabbed for signature. The Credit Association moved for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiffs could not prove their claims because the parol evidence rule barred evidence of any representations contradicting the terms of the written agreement.

At the time that the plaintiffs brought their complaint, California had operated under the longstanding rule set forth in Bank of America etc. Assn. v. Pendergrass, 4 Cal. 2d 258 (1935), which prohibited the use of parol evidence in cases where fraud is alleged in connection with a purportedly “integrated” contractual agreement.

In Riverisland the Supreme Court concluded that the limitations Pendergrass placed on the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule were not supported by the language of the statute establishing that exception (CCP § 1856(f)(g)) or consistent with prior case law. (55 Cal.4th at 1182)  Further, it held that “Pendergrass failed to account for the fundamental principle that fraud undermines the essential validity of the parties’ agreement. When fraud is proven, it cannot be maintained that the parties freely entered into an agreement reflecting a meeting of the minds. . . . Parol evidence is always admissible to prove fraud, and it was never intended that the parol evidence rule should be used as a shield to prevent the proof of fraud.” (Id. at 1180–1182)

How will this affect contract related litigation in California?   Riverisland leans against a court granting dispositive motions, like demurrers, motions for summary judgment, and motions for judgment on the pleadings, where the plaintiff alleges or can show that there is parol evidence supporting their claims, even if the contract is “fully integrated” and/or has an integration clause.

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